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Enlightened  public  opinion  in  general  and  government  policy  in
particular  have come a long way from those days when it was believed
that  the  market  mechanism,  if  left  alone,  would  provide  for  a  max-
imum of social welfare.
The normative branch  of economics-welfare  economics-recog-
nizes  that  public  policy  should  interfere  with  the  operation  of  the
market mechanism,  but only with  the aim  of making  it more efficient.
In  this  sense,  then,  welfare  economics  is  concerned  primarily  with
economic welfare rather than with social  welfare  at  large. It operates
on  the  underlying  norm  of  market  efficiency  in  the  narrow  sense.
Economists  have  generally  been  more  than  reluctant  to  make  pro-
nouncements on the  goals or objectives  of any policy  aimed  mainly  at
redistribution  of income.  This  was  held  to  be  the legitimate  field  of
the politician,  or of other  branches  of the  social  sciences,  and  not  a
proper subject  for economic  science.
An  emerging  subdiscipline  of  economics  which  recognizes  the
need for control of those processes  not regulated  by the price  mecha-
nism is called the "welfare  economics  of interdependence,"  or "grants
economics."  Grants  economics  is  concerned  with  equity  and  other
goals  as  integral  parts  of  economic  inquiry.  It  says  that  the  aim  of
public  policy is not only  the  attainment  of economic  welfare  but  so-
cial  welfare  at large.  It postulates  that  a  variety  of  economic  instru-
ments  available  to the public decision  maker  should be  used  not  only
to improve  market  efficiency  or to obtain  economic  stability  but  also
to promote  growth,  equity,  system  maintenance,  and  integration-or
what may be  termed general efficiency  norms. The discussion that  fol-
lows  will  deal  with  income  maintenance  primarily  within  the  termi-
nology associated  with this subdiscipline.
Apart from  the  mainstream  of economic  inquiry,  the theory  and
policy of public finance has always  recognized the need to redistribute
income over and beyond  the pattern resulting from market operations.
The  government  has  considered  policies  designed  to  enhance  in-
come  in  time  of  adversity,  an  important  part  of  public  policy,  par-
ticularly  since  the  1930's.  However,  the  package  of  social  security
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from  a  philosophy  of  providing  income  in  situations  of  temporary
inability  rather  than  from  a  general  policy  of  income  maintenance
outside  the  logic  of whatever  the market  mechanism  may  allocate  to
a particular  individual.  Examples  would  be  found  in  unemployment
support,  clearly  a short-run  measure,  as  well as in  old age pensions  or
social  security. The  latter  might  be  considered intermediate-run  mea-
sures in the sense that they do not span the entire life of the individual.
Today  we  notice  an  increasing  shift  to  a  philosophy  of  "income
augmentation"  for  the  long-run  betterment  of  the  social  welfare  of
the  population.  The  extreme  philosophy  of  income  augmentation  is
found  in the variety  of proposals  for  a guaranteed  income  or  a  nega-
tive income  tax, which  have gained increased  currency  among serious
economists  and public policy makers.
THE  POLICY  SETTING  FOR  INCOME  MAINTENANCE
If we  consider  a norm or goal as  an  end  toward  which  effort  or
ambition  is  directed,  then  we  may  define  an objective  as  the  instru-
mental  or  operational  expression  of  that  goal.  Income  maintenance
is a specific  objective which results  from  a variety of social goals.  The
transfer  of  income  from  one  income  class  to  another,  or  from  one
social  group  to  another,  arises  not only  because  of  considerations  of
equity or justice,  but  also  because  of considerations  of  system  main-
tenance,  that is, the desire to keep an alienated  subgroup of the popula-
tion within  the pattern  of relationships.  It also derives from  the norm
of  integration,  that  is,  from  the  desire  to decrease  the  percentage  of
people  who are  alienated  in total society.  Income  maintenance  there-
fore  is an instrumental  variable  designed  to take care  of  a variety of
other  broader  social norms  or goals.
Table  1 illustrates one possible  structure  of relationships  underly-
ing public  policy  making.  Efficiency,  growth,  stability, equity,  free-
dom and security, integration, and  system  maintenance are  some  of
the most dominant norms  that come readily to mind.  Generally  speak-
ing,  efficiency  is  associated  with the  operation  of the  market  mecha-
nism.  Growth  generally-but  not  always-emanates  from  the  most
efficient  allocation  of resources.  In this  sense,  one might  say  that the
market or exchange  economy  is  concerned  with  efficiency,  while  the
grants economy relates to growth,  stability,  equity,  freedom  and secur-
ity, integration,  and system maintenance.
The  basic  difference  between  the  exchange  economy  and  the
grants  economy  is  the  nature  of  economic  flows:  Under  exchange,
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IParty A receives an exchangeable  of equal market value. Under grants,
A transfers  an  exchangeable  to  B,  without  receiving  in  return  a  cor-
responding  economic  exchangeable.  This  is not to deny the possibility
that A may  receive  some  type of satisfaction  or  a nonmarket  benefit,
such as  prestige  or status,  but these  are not generally  classified  as  ex-
changeables.
Most  economic  relationships  are  of  a  mixed  nature,  including
both exchange  and  grants elements. Furthermore,  many public policy
measures convey  either  an explicit grant  or an  implicit grant  to some
groups  in society.  An example  is found  in  fiscal  or monetary  policy,
where  special  exemptions convey  unequal benefits  to different income
or social classes; or in the rezoning  of land from  agricultural  to  com-
mercial  uses,  which  provides  an  implicit  grant  to  landowners  and
speculators.
The norms of efficiency  and stability  are familiar in public policy.
Going  on  to  equity  as  a norm  for  a  public  policy,  we  may  mention
antipoverty programs  as  a specific  expression  of a social  equity norm.
Freedom  and  security,  in turn,  are  norms  underlying  the  present  op-
eration  of  the  social  security  program,  while  the  desire  to promote
more  harmonious  relationships  between  various  groups  of  the  com-
munity  is  expressed  through  various  community  development  and
integration  programs.  Finally,  compulsory  arbitration  programs,
agricultural  price  support  programs,  or progams  designed  to  reduce
the  level of  alienation  among the urban  poor,  might be cited  as  mea-
sures of system maintenance.
The  label  "income  maintenance  programs"  has  generally  been
associated with antipoverty and social security programs.  Accordingly,
they  are primarily  directed  toward  the  goals  of  equity,  freedom,  and
security.  Integration  or  system  maintenance  might  have  been  con-
sidered  as incidental  benefits.
When  a broader  view  is  taken  of individuals  in  the total  system,
we  must  recognize  that  social  security  programs  do  have  a  system
maintenance  and integration  effect.  They protect the  system  from be-
ing  saddled  with  large  numbers  of unemployed  individuals  or  desti-
tute  families.  Thus  they  act  as  a  "social  stabilizer,"  preventing  the
violent  disruption  of  production  and  consumption  that  is  usually
associated  with  a revolution.  This thought  is  also  implicit in Kenneth
Boulding's view of the role of income maintenance policy  (in his book,
Principles of Economic Policy):
All  modern nations  accept the principle  that there is  some minimal
level  of real  income  below  which  its individuals  or households  cannot
be  allowed  to  fall.  This  led  at  quite  an  early  date,  to  the  development
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"floor"  of  subsistence  which  is  in  a  sense  a  "right"  of  every  indi-
vidual....  In no country  does there  seem  to have been  strong pressure
from  the  electorate  for  the specific  plans that were  put into  operation.
Political  pressure  and  dissatisfaction  of  course  there  was,  but  it  took
the form of broad movements  rather than specific  pressures-the  Social
Democratic  Movement  in  Germany,  the  Socialist  Movement  in
England,  the various radical  movements  in  the United  States-perhaps
it is  not  unfair  to interpret  the  social  security  program  that  developed
as  an  essentially  "conservative"  program  to  forestall  pressures  for
something  more  radical.  From  this  point  of  view  the  programs  have
been  highly  successful;  they  have  contributed  a  great  deal  towards
"the  deproletarianization"-integration  of the  mass  of the  people  into
the  general  economic  fabric-and  have  greatly  increased  the  degree
of general  acceptance  of  existing  institutions.  If  we  no  longer live  in
a revolutionary  era,  social  security  must  be  given  a  good  deal  of the
credit  (or  blame,  if  one  is  concerned  about  the  soporific  effects  of
security).
The  need  to include  integration  and  system  maintenance  among
the  goals  of  income  maintenance  programs  becomes  evident  when  a
basic  rationale  for  social  welfare  is  considered.  The  need  for  social
action  is  apparent,  particularly  because  individual  preferences  seem
to be inadequate  to provide,  through private savings,  for contingencies
of  retirement,  unemployment,  or  accidents.  This  calls  for  political
decisions  which result in  legislation requiring social  security  contribu-
tions in the form of a tax rather than in the form of voluntary contribu-
tions.
This  interference  with  individual  preferences  would  generally  be
considered  as  a  decrease  in  individual  welfare  by  the  pure  welfare
economists.  However,  the  limited  planning horizon  of  the individual,
as well  as the interdependence  between  the  well-being  of  a particular
indivdiual  and other  individuals,  make  a  case  for  social  intervention.
Interdependencies  are  quite evident  in the  case of the family  itself
as  well as  the  larger group.  The principle of individual  decision  mak-
ing  that  assumes  an  independence  of individual  preferences  becomes
somewhat  tenuous  when  one  individual's  mistakes  affect  the  well-
being  of  his  family,  his  community,  or  the  nation  at  large.  Further-
more, under the  assumption of interdependence,  there is no theoretical
rationale  for  even  requiring  an  individual  to  suffer  the  consequences
of his  own actions.  Accordingly,  the need  for a variety  of integration
and system  maintenance  norms  arises in  connection  with  a variety  of
income  maintenance  programs.
TRADE-OFFS  BETWEEN  MARKET  EFFICIENCY  AND
GENERAL  EFFICIENCY
Social security programs have lost that analogy to insurance  where
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have  become  essentially  tax-transfer  or  grants  programs.  This  is  evi-
dent  from  the  size  of  the  benefits  which  have  only  a  very  tenuous
relationship with the cost  incurred by the individual through the social
security  tax. Thus  we see the dual nature  of income maintenance  pro-
grams.  On  the  one  hand,  they  provide  for  needs  irrespective  of  the
past exchange or work behavior of the  individual.  On the other  hand,
they provide for contingencies  in the course  of work  behavior  as  well
as  for transfers  along  the  life cycle  of the individual.
We  may  note  a  clear  distinction  between  the  exchange  analogy
inherent in the insurance  view and  the grant or transfer  analogy  iden-
tified  with  the  universal  "demo-grant  approach"  to  income  mainte-
nance.  The  former attempts  to associate  the specific  techniques  of im-
plementation  with  the  concept  of  exchange  and  private  insurance.
This entails the  analysis  of criteria which  qualify an  individual  to  re-
ceive  certain  benefits.  The  demo-grant  approach,  however,  does  not
analyze  the  particular  need  aspect  of  the  recipient.  It  treats  social
security  as  a  right  of  membership  in  society  at  large.  Therefore,  it
does not require  a  means  test  for  eligibility  and  other  types  of  pro-
cedures  which  generally  humiliate  the recipient.
Larger  grants  can  be  expected  when  social  security,  and  other
related  measures,  are  viewed  essentially  as  tax-transfer  programs
rather than as  insurance programs.  The grants approach  might there-
fore be  considered  less  efficient than the  welfare approach.  But  social
security programs  based  only on the welfare  approach,  while  alleviat-
ing  some  aspects  of  poverty  for  the  individual,  may  fail  to  achieve
integration  or  system  maintenance  for  a group  of recipients  at large.
The  humiliation  involved  in  detailed  probing  to  ascertain  eligibility
is  likely  to have bad psychological  effects  in  a culture  which  empha-
sizes  individual  work  and  the  Protestant  Ethic.  The  choice  between
the  demo-grant  and  the  welfare  approach  therefore  involves  clearly
a  trade-off  between  market-efficiency  and  equity  considerations,  as
well  as between  market-efficiency  and  integration  and  system  main-
tenance  aspects.  From  this it  is  evident  that  there  is  generally  an  in-
herent  conflict  in  the  norms  or  goals,  and  that  complex  trade-offs
between  the various  goals  is  a general feature  of public income  main-
tenance policy.
The problem  in arriving at the magnitude  of income maintenance
programs  is  rarely,  however,  a  simple  trade-off  between  different
norms  competing  for  a  fixed  budget.  Generally  speaking,  a  higher
commitment to equity  and other norms  entails  a more costly  program
than  a commitment  to  market-efficiency  norms  alone.  This  does not
prove,  however, that one is  more desirable  than the other. In order to
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benefits  must be contrasted  with total  costs.  Some  trade-off  between
these  two  norms must  be made.  How  valuable  is  it  in  terms  of  the
aspirations  of the  total society,  that  a certain  degree  of equity  is  ob-
tained,  as compared  to  a certain  degree  of market  efficiency?  Society
may, in fact, have an overriding preference  system  that favors neither
of the  two.  An  analysis  of the  objectives  of social  security,  therefore,
must  take  note  of  this  trade-off  between  conflicting  values  without
which  the social security  system  is not satisfactory  on either  score.
Those who value market efficiency  as an overriding goal are bound
to be dissatisfied with the present social  welfare system  simply because
they  see  inherent  inefficiencies  in  the  system.  Those,  again,  who  are
concerned  with  the need and  suffering  of  the indigent  and  the  unem-
ployed would  favor  going far beyond  the present  level  of social  wel-
fare  allocations.  It comes  as  little  surprise,  therefore,  that  the  social
security  system  as  a  whole  does  not  gain  any  ardent  advocates  on
either end of  the value  scale.  However,  experts  in the  field  have little
problem  in recognizing  that,  given  the dual  or multiple  nature  of  the
underlying objectives,  the present  system  may not be  so bad  after  all.
Even  though  experts  recognize  the  merits  of  the present  system
in achieving  some goals of the American  society,  others  would  argue
that  the  system  does  not  go  far  enough  in  meeting  equity  and  re-
lated  general-efficiency  goals.  As  long  as  millions  remain  in  stark
poverty,  alienated  and  befuddled  by  the  optimistic  claims  of  the
spokesmen  of  the  high-mass-consumption  society,  if  not  angry  with
what they perceive  to be  their deprivation  of  civil  and human  rights,
something  must clearly be done  to achieve social balance.
EFFECTS  ON  THE  RECIPIENT  OF  WELFARE  VERSUS
GUARANTEED  INCOME
The present  system  of social  welfare-termed  briefly  the welfare
system-is  characterized  by  several  features  which  account  for  its
strength  and  its weakness.  First,  the  system  is  geared  more  toward
intertemporal or intergeneration  redistribution  than to  a genuine  effort
to meet basic needs.  Second, for those aspects  of the program that are
specifically  geared  to the downtrodden,  a means  test generally  results
in a sense of stigma and degradation  on the part of the recipient.  And
third, the  level of payments  is generally  not adequate  to support  any-
one at a tolerable  level  of living without  his having  to work or obtain
additional  income.
No  doubt  these  features  have been  built  purposely  into  the  wel-
fare  system  and  give  it  its  particular  character.  We  may  distinguish
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degree  yet,  but which  we  shall identify  with the  term  guaranteed  in-
come  system  proper.  Such  a system  is,  first,  more  directly  concerned
with a need per se without  such  stringent  requirements  for  work  be-
havior on the part of the recipient.  Second,  no means  test is  required
and  hence  the  humiliation  involved  in accepting  a  transfer  under  the
guaranteed  income  scheme  is  very small  if it exists  at  all.  And  third,
the  amount transferred  will in some cases  be  adequate  to maintain  an
individual  at  a basic  level  of subsistence  without his  having  to  work.
A shift  from  the  welfare  system  to  a  guaranteed  income  system
therefore  entails  not  only  a  rearrangement  in  programs,  but  also  a
rearrangement  in the  values of society.  This entails  an  attitude  toward
the  needy which  is not  as  intimately  tied  in  with  the  attitude  toward
work and saving-the Protestant Ethic-and therefore  involves fewer
criteria  for  eligibility.  Furthermore,  if  such  an  income  maintenance
scheme is generalized  so that everyone  receives  a certain  minimum in-
come,  the stigma is eliminated  entirely.
If we  assume that one  individual's  well-being  is  intimately tied  in
with another individual's  well-being, the receipt of grants  income gives
rise to mixed feelings  on  the part of  the recipient.  On  the  one  hand,
his well-being  increases  because with  this change  in income  he is  able
to buy more goods  and  therefore  his  consumption  standard  rises.  On
the other  hand,  the  very  necessity  of having  to  accept  it,  via  an  in-
termediary,  or having to accept it at all, entails psychic costs. In  short,
this  type  of mixed  reaction  can  be  divided  into  four  components  of
reaction or utility,  namely those associated  with:
1. An  increase  in  the recipient's  income.
2.  A  reduction in the community's  income.
3.  Receipt  of  the grant  via  an  intermediary  social  worker.
4.  Other sentiments  of the recipient  in connection  with  the grant.
Each  of  these  components  can  have  a  positive  or negative  effect
on the recipient's well-being.  Generally,  the first component is positive,
because  his income  goes  up  and  therefore  his  command  over  goods
and services  supplied through  the market increases.  The  second com-
ponent,  however,  may  be relatively  small  as  the  grantor-grantee  rela-
tionship  is depersonalized:  Since  the grant comes  from the community
at large,  the grantee  is  not likely  to  know  the person  who gave  up  a
part of his  income through taxes in order to  finance the income  trans-
fer.  Therefore  he  is not likely  to  feel  a  sense of  disutility from  con-
templating the income loss of the grantor as may be the case in a small
community  characterized  by personalized  relationships.  Furthermore,
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curtail, expand,  or continue the grant-has a pronounced effect on the
recipient's  feelings.  Interpersonal  relations  between  the  social  worker
and the recipient may  contribute  to  positive  feelings  in  case  of favor-
able  relations,  or negative  feelings  if  the grantee  resents  the  "pater-
nalistic  attitude"  of  the social worker.  Finally,  the  fourth  component
reflects  the grantee's general  attitude  toward  having to receive  grants.
In  a culture emphasizing  work,  the  fourth component  is  likely  to  re-
flect the recipient's sense of humiliation  and stigma associated  with the
means  test  and  related  policing  procedures.  It  is  therefore  generally
negative.
Under the present welfare system  the third and fourth components
are  generally  negative,  decreasing  the  positive  effect  of  the  income
transfer  in  the  mind of the  recipient,  and  leading  possibly  to further
alienation  of the individual and disintegration  of the social system.
Under  a  guaranteed  income  system,  in  contrast,  the  third  com-
ponent would become zero-as the receipt of income is automatic  and
without  the  interference  of  a  social  worker-while  the  fourth  com-
ponent  is  likely to  be very  small  if it exists  at  all.  The aims of guar-
anteed income  plans,  therefore,  are not  only  to  eliminate  poverty
through more adequate income  transfers but also to  reduce,  if  not
eliminate,  the  sense  of  humiliation associated with  present  welfare
programs.
Operationally,  these  guaranteed  income  proposals  have been  tied
either to the present or alternative  tax system-hence their designation
as  negative  income  tax  (which  means  positive  income  transfer)
schemes-or  to  a basic income  allowance  for which each  member  of
the  family  is  eligible.  The  former  approach,  it  appears,  derives  an
equity norm from the progressivity  and the structure of implied grants
(tax  filer's  exemptions  and  standard  deductions)  of  the  present  tax
system  (for example,  the Friedman negative income tax plan)  or from
a  family's  poverty  line  based  on  some  concept  of  subsistence  living
(for example,  the Lampman  plan).  Under  the first  plan,  the  taxpayer
receives  annual  payments  equal  to  some  percentage  (negative  tax
or  positive  transfer  rate)  of  his  unused  exemptions  and  deductions.
Under  the  second  plan,  a  family  in  poverty  would  be  entitled  to
transfers  equal  to some  percentage  of its  "poverty  income  gap"  (that
is,  the difference  between  its present  income  and  the  level  of  income
required  to  move  out  of poverty).
The  second  approach-identified  with  the  plans  of  Tobin  and
Rolph-also  denotes  a  tax  schedule  which  specifies  the  amount  by
which  each  dollar  of  grant income  is  reduced  for  each  dollar  of  ex-
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tax  credit  in  lieu  of personal  income tax exemptions.)
All of  these  proposals  derive  transfer  amounts  by  an  impersonal
formula  and  some  equity  rule  for  minimum  income  support,  thus
reducing  the  disutility  aspects  of having  to  receive  grants  via  a per-
sonalized  intermediary  and  with  an  associated  stigma.  The  more re-
cent  proposals  by  the  President's  Commission  on  Income  Mainte-
nance,  as well as President Nixon's Family Assistance  Plan, are derived
essentially  from  a  similar  set of  norms.  The  Family Assistance  Plan,
however,  combines  explicitly  an  efficiency  criterion with  the  national
equity  norms of the Plan,  that is, the need  to register  for employment
and to accept  an offer of training and work if available.  Thus,  at least
implicitly,  it  takes  into  account  both  market  efficiency  and  general
efficiency  norms  in  proposing  a  variant  of  a  guaranteed  income
scheme.
IN  CONCLUSION
Present  welfare  programs  as  well  as  some  of  the  guaranteed  in-
come proposals  contain provisions  which  are  the  result  of  conflicting
norms.  This  conflict  in  underlying  norms  is not  a reflection  of  irra-
tionality  of  public  decision  making  but  of  the  nature  of  a  complex
society:  Market  efficiency  has to  be tempered  by general efficiency-
stability,  growth,  system  maintenance,  integration,  and  so on-if  so-
cial  welfare  is to  be  improved.  This  gives  rise  to complex  trade-offs
between  norms.  The  trade-offs  inherent  in  the proposals  for  a  guar-
anteed income  appear  to  reflect  a greater  weight  for  equity,  integra-
tion,  and  system  maintenance  norms  than  is  inherent  in  the  welfare
system.  This  shift  will  not only  reduce  the  instance  of poverty-for
which  the  present  welfare  system  is clearly inadequate-but  it is  also
likely to decrease alienation  and increase integration  within the Amer-
ican society.
The current  trade-off  between  market  efficiency  and  general  effi-
ciency norms is not very popular with those who  see themselves  passed
over  by the welfare  system  in particular,  and  the whole  public  grants
economy  in  general.  If  the  public  decision  makers  recognize  their
responsibility  for the attainment of a variety of goals  and  objectives-
as  the current  measures  of income  maintenance  reform  seem  to  sug-
gest-the first steps  will have been taken  to  solve the social problems
of  our  day.  If public  policy,  however,  takes  a narrower  view  of  its
obligations  and  goals,  the  social  applecart  may  have  to  tumble  even
further,  before  the  social  and  economic  signals  resulting  from  dis-
equilibrating  forces  are  read  in unmistakable  terms.
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